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THE ADA AND MOVIE CAPTIONING: A
LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO AN
OBVIOUS DESTINATION
John F. Waldo*
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century,1 movies have been America’s favorite evening
out. Yet since the advent of “talkies,” wherein the audience can hear the
actors speaking on film, movies have been inaccessible to a substantial
number of people3—those with hearing loss of such a degree that even
while using the Assistive Listening Devices movie theaters are required
to furnish they cannot understand movie dialogue.4
2

*
The author is a sole practitioner in Portland, Oregon, who focuses his practice on
advocacy for and representation of people with hearing loss. He is the advocacy director
and counsel to the Washington State Communication Access Project (“Wash-CAP”) and
counsel to the Oregon Communication Access Project (“OR-CAP”), non-profit corporations
whose mission is to make public places accessible to people with hearing loss. He received
his J.D. from the University of Utah in 1981, where he was a member of the Order of the
Coif and served on the Board of Editors of the Utah Law Review.
1
Bob Mondello, 100th Anniversary of First U.S. Movie Theater, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June
17, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4707873.
2
Industry statistics indicate that in 2009, box office ticket sales totaled $10.6 billion.
Total U.S. & Canada Box Office Grosses, NAT’L ASS’N THEATER OWNERS,
http://www.natoonline.org/statisticsboxoffice.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
3
Estimates of the number of people with significant hearing loss vary according to the
reporting method used and the definition of hearing loss. Arguably, the most reliable
estimate comes from a study at Johns Hopkins University that used actual audiometric
(hearing test) data from a large, random sample of the U.S. adult population. See Yuri
Agrawal et al., Prevalence of Hearing Loss and Differences by Demographic Characteristics
Among U.S. Adults, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1522, 1524 (2008) (reporting in Table 1
that in a sample from 1999 to 2004, 7.8% of adults aged twenty to sixty-nine have a hearing
loss in both ears that interferes with their ability to understand speech to the point that it is
considered “handicapping,” rather than merely inconvenient by the American Academy of
Otolaryngology); see also ROBERT A. DOBIE, MEDICAL-LEGAL EVALUATION OF HEARING LOSS
90 (2000) (explaining testing methodologies and medical consensus as to when hearing loss
becomes material and handicapping).
4
Movie theaters built or significantly altered after 1993 with fifty or more fixed seats
are required to have volume-enhancing listening devices. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.401, 36.402
(2010); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (2010) (incorporating the standards for accessible
design); ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities, § 4.33 (2004), available at
http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/ADAAG.pdf. Those devices benefit individuals
with mild hearing loss, but may be insufficient for people with more significant losses or
those who are deaf altogether. Ball v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 n.17 (D.D.C.
2003); see, e.g., U.S. ACCESS BD., BULL. NO. 9B: FOR INSTALLERS, ASSISTIVE LISTENING SYSTEMS
1–2 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/about/bulletins/pdf/
als-installer.pdf (explaining that the most common forms of hearing loss affect the ability to
hear higher-frequency sounds, including the consonants that shape and give meaning to
speech). Many people with hearing loss hear voices at normal or near-normal volume but
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Making movie soundtracks accessible to people with hearing loss is
technically simple. Dialogue, song lyrics, and other pertinent aural
information—like a “gunshot” or “door closing”—is put into written
form and then displayed as captions, allowing viewers to “hear” with
their eyes.5
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),6 aimed at
incorporating people with disabilities into the mainstream of American
life,7 requires that businesses such as movie theaters implement available
measures to make their services accessible to people with disabilities.
Captioned movies for people with hearing loss would seem to be
precisely the kind of accommodation that the ADA envisioned, but
twenty years after the Act’s passage, only a tiny fraction of the movies
being shown in American theaters are accessible. This situation is
attributable to the intransigence of the large corporate-owned theater
chains, overly narrow judicial interpretations of the ADA, the failure of
the statute itself, and the relevant federal agency’s failure to define
critical terms.
For a number of reasons, 2010 appears likely to be the tipping point
in the quest for meaningful access to the movies. Court decisions in the
first half of the year significantly increased the legal pressure to provide
captioned films.
As the year ended, the long-awaited “digital
revolution”8 was finally getting under way, enabling at least some
theaters to make captioned films available at a cost low enough to
moderate some of the theaters’ historic resistance to captioning.
cannot understand what is being said. Id. Because comprehension rather than volume is
the problem, simply increasing the volume is, in many cases, not a sufficient solution. Id. at
2.
Many individuals who do not actually understand speech are still able to
communicate aurally, at least in some circumstances. Awareness of context and visual cues
allow people with hearing loss to follow the general drift of what is being said even
without full understanding of the words being spoken. But in the author’s experience as a
person with a significant hearing loss, those coping mechanisms are insufficient at a movie,
principally because the essence of drama or especially comedy arises when something
unexpected is said. Those critical punch lines and plot turns are what a person with
hearing loss is likely to miss.
5
See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 668
(9th Cir. 2010) (accurately describing current methods of captioning movies).
6
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
7
Id. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008) (“The Congress finds that . . . physical or mental
disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society,
yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing so
because of discrimination . . . .”).
8
See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which the use of
digital technology was considered). Rather than using celluloid reels, movies are being
distributed as digital data packages. Thus, “film” may go the way of “records,” and be
replaced in part or in whole by digital data.
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Furthermore, after years of indecision, the United States Department of
Justice (“DOJ”), empowered to issue regulations governing “public
accommodations” such as movie theaters,9 issued an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in which it proposed a movie-captioning
requirement.10
Although the DOJ’s entry into the fray was most welcome, the
specific proposal was disappointing in that it would require only half of
the nation’s theater screens to show captioned films and would phase
implementation of that requirement over a five-year period beginning
one year from the date the regulations are finally adopted.11 On a
positive note, the DOJ indicated that it may modify some of its
regulations dealing with how movie captioning is done. Specifically, the
DOJ is considering permitting, and perhaps even encouraging, open
captioning—a delivery mode that is both inexpensive and appeals to a
significant segment of the population with hearing loss.
This Article will begin by discussing the structure of the ADA as it
applies to access to public places for people with hearing loss and the
particular snippet of legislative history that pertains to movie theaters.12
Second, this Article discusses how the dilemma created by a legislative
history that arguably conflicts with the language of the statute, combined
with the ADA’s own vagueness, led to a number of judicial decisions
negating any captioning requirement.13 Third, this Article discusses the
case that reversed that trend.14 Fourth, this Article critically examines
the DOJ’s proposed captioning rule, questions whether the proposal is
consistent with the ADA’s language, and suggests a regulatory approach
that would advance the DOJ’s objectives of transparency and ease of
administration while still being consistent with the ADA’s language.15
Finally, this Article encourages the DOJ to promote multiple forms of
movie captioning.16
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
See §§ 12182, 12186(b) (empowering the DOJ to enforce the ADA); Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video Description, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,467
(proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (explaining that the DOJ is
considering a revision in its regulations regarding the ADA as it relates to moviecaptioning).
11
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video
Description, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,474.
12
See infra Part II (discussing the ADA and movie captioning).
13
See infra Part III (reviewing early cases on movie captioning requirements under the
ADA).
14
See infra Part IV (explaining how the Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement
Enterprises, Inc. decision changed movie captioning jurisprudence).
15
See infra Part V (discussing the DOJ’s proposed captioning rule).
16
See infra Part VI (urging the DOJ to take action).
9

10
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II. THE ADA AND MOVIE CAPTIONING
Congress passed the ADA in 1990, intending for it to serve as a
“comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”17 The ADA doesn’t simply forbid
discriminatory acts, it also forbids omissions that have a discriminatory
result. Just as covered employers are required to make “reasonable
accommodations” to otherwise qualified employees to enable them to
work at parity with a non-disabled employee,18 privately owned “public
accommodations,” such as a “motion picture house [or] theater”19
covered by Title III of the ADA, must undertake certain affirmative acts
to make their goods and services accessible to people with disabilities.20
The provision pertinent to movie captioning is the requirement that
public accommodations offer “auxiliary aids and services.”21 These are
defined by example as including “qualified interpreters or other effective
methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals
with hearing impairments”22 when the absence of those aids and services
effectively denies disabled individuals “the full and equal enjoyment of
the
goods,
services,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages,
or
23
accommodations” offered by the business.
Although the motive and intent of the ADA may have been inspired
by civil rights legislation,24 its economic justification is similar to no-fault
tort law, especially workers’ compensation and products liability law.
These bodies of law recognize that no matter how much care is
exercised, a number of injuries will occur. Rather than requiring the
injured individual to bear all the consequences—essentially telling the
victim of the fortuitous accident that it is his or her tough luck—no-fault
law shifts the financial consequences to the enterprises involved. These
enterprises bear the financial burden, not because they are collectively at
fault, but because they are able to distribute the loss throughout their
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
19
Id. § 12181(7)(C).
20
Id. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12181(7), 12181–89.
21
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). Discrimination includes failure to furnish auxiliary aids and
services. Id.
22
Id. § 12102(1)(A).
23
Id. § 12182(a) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases
(or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”).
24
See, e.g., MARK C. WEBER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY LAW 2 (2007) (“The Americans
with Disabilities Act might be viewed as the culmination of activism and political efforts
inspired by a civil rights, integrationist approach to disability.”).
17
18
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industry and through the mechanism of liability insurance. The cost of
insurance will, in turn, presumably become a routine cost of doing
business, incorporated into their price structure and thereby part of the
price paid for the product.25
The ADA operates in a similar manner. It treats disability as a
“casualty” that occurs without fault. Rather than explaining to disabled
individuals that the frequent consequences of disability—exclusion and
isolation—are their “tough luck,” the ADA states that where feasible
measures exist to mitigate the effects of that disability, businesses
covered by the Act should take those measures at their own expense.
Although insurance cannot be used as a cost-distribution mechanism, the
fact that very similar access requirements apply to all firms operating
similar businesses may make it possible for individual firms to adjust
their prices to reflect the cost of providing access without sustaining a
competitive disadvantage. Assuming all competitors are under equal
pressure to adhere to the legal requirements of becoming accessible to
the disabled, those requirements should be no more onerous than other
non-discretionary operating costs, such as electricity, that equally affect
every market participant.
The ADA seems often regarded as unfair by the public and the
bench, either because its loss-spreading mechanism is not explicitly
articulated, or because the cost and difficulty of providing
accommodations is frequently exaggerated.26 Some opponents view the
cost of compliance as a form of punishment that should not be inflicted
upon a business not at fault. Furthermore, that perception has been
enhanced by well-publicized abuses, particularly in California, where a
few individuals turned access litigation into something of a cottage
industry, a situation for which the ADA was erroneously blamed.27 As a
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (“[P]ublic policy
demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for
consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of
production against which liability insurance can be obtained . . . .”).
26
See, e.g., Walter Olson, ADA 20th Anniversary, CATO@LIBERTY.ORG (July 26, 2010: 3:42
PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/adas-20th-anniversary/. While some politicians,
notably Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, have called for repeal of the ADA, supra, it
apparently remains rather popular in Congress, as indicated by the passage of the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213), in
which Congress explicitly overruled a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that had
narrowed the scope of the act. The statute passed the House of Representatives by a 402 to
17 vote, and passed the Senate by unanimous consent. Sidebar, The ADA Restoration Basics,
AM. ASS’N PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, http://adarestoration.blogspot.com/ (last visited Jan.
29, 2011).
27
The ADA permits private parties to seek injunctive relief only, not damages, for
violation of accessibility provisions of the ADA. JONATHAN R. MOOK, AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES § 6.02[5] (1996).
25
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result, access claims have frequently been treated with unwarranted
skepticism.28
The requirement to provide auxiliary aids and services is far from
absolute.
Rather, the requirement exists “unless the entity can
demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature
of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation
being offered or would result in an undue burden.”29 In essence,
Congress said auxiliary aids and services must be provided unless doing
so would cost too much, but Congress provided no guidance as to what
“too much” might be. That omission, deliberate or otherwise,30 has had
the unfortunate consequence of making ADA access claims highly
contentious. With no guidance, the business can assert in good faith that
providing access would be an “undue” burden or a “fundamental”
alteration to its existing structure, while those requesting access can
assert the contrary. It is not surprising that busy courts, rather than
trying to define “undue burden” with no guidance, reach unexplained
conclusions or look for alternative ways to dispose of the case.31
California’s Unruh Act, however, states that any violation of the ADA is a violation of the
Unruh Act, and permits a plaintiff to recover minimum damages of $4000 per day. Molski
v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). Some plaintiffs in wheelchairs would
file numerous suits against restaurants toward the end of the one-year limitations period,
then demand settlements of $4000 per day of uncorrected violations. One particularly
notorious plaintiff was judicially declared to be a vexatious litigant and was required to
seek court permission before filing suits. Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant, 347 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 868 (C.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500
F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 521 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2008).
28
See Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 521 F.3d at 1217 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (upholding a
vexatious litigant declaration even though the panel and the district court “both expressly
concede that [Molski’s numerous lawsuits] are probably meritorious”).
29
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
30
As is often the case, the ADA was weakened considerably during congressional
negotiations, frequently to ease the burden that the statute might impose on small
businesses. A proposal to define the closely related concept of “undue hardship” as
threatening an employer’s continued existence was rejected during the debate. See Michael
Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 172 n.514
(2003). Professor Stein’s article discusses the obligation of employers to furnish
“reasonable accommodations” to employees, but some of his reasoning is at least
inferentially relevant to questions involving the provision of access. Id. at 79.
31
The cases that have actually attempted to quantify or even fully describe what might
constitute an “undue burden” are neither consistent nor helpful. On the one hand, the
“undue hardship” that relieves an employer of the need to provide reasonable
accommodations to an employee, is a concept closely akin if not identical to the “undue
burden” concept. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2010) (defining “undue burden”), with 42
U.S.C. § 12111(10) (defining “undue hardship”). Indeed, the Eastern District of Texas
declared “undue hardship” in passing to be “a concept approaching financial ruin.” See
Anderson v. Gus Mayer Bos. Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 781 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (applying this
definition, despite the fact that it was reportedly rejected during Congressional debate).
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To further complicate matters, a House of Representatives report on
the ADA contains a snippet dealing specifically with captioned movies.
The report explains that “[o]pen-captioning, for example, of feature films
playing in movie theaters, is not required by this legislation.”32
Nevertheless, that same report goes on to state that future technological
“advances may require public accommodations to provide auxiliary aids
and services in the future which today would not be required because
they would be held to impose undue burdens on such entities.”33
At the time the ADA was enacted, the issue of captioned movies was
somewhat academic. The movie theaters did not and could not caption
the movies themselves, and the studios were under no obligation to
caption their product. Thus, other than subtitled foreign films, there was
simply no captioned product available in 1990.
That situation began to change in 1993 when Tripod Captioned
Films, an independent non-profit company, and Insight Cinemas, a
successor organization, undertook to borrow movie prints, prepare
captions that were then laser-burned onto the prints, and then distribute
the prints to theaters.34 Those captioned prints could be played on any
projector, and the captions were “open,” meaning visible to everyone in
the audience. Due to the fact that very few movies were captioned, very
few prints of those movies were available out of the few movies that
were captioned. Any captioned prints would not become available until
several weeks after the movie opened, and those theaters that were
willing to show the captioned prints generally only scheduled one or
two showings, normally on weeknights.35
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit concluded that an accommodation that would have
cost $95 per week was an undue burden on an enterprise whose operating revenue was
$9500 per month. Roberts v. Kinder Care Learning Ctrs, Inc., 86 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir.
1991). Somewhere in the middle is the puzzling case of Alford v. City of Cannon Beach, a case
arising out of an Oregon district court in which the court states that the appropriate
financial variable is gross revenue. No. CV-00-303-HU, 2002 WL 31439173, at *9 (D. Or. Jan.
15, 2002). The court further states that the question of whether an accommodation that
would cost 2.7% of gross revenue is an undue burden is a question of fact, but that because
the accommodation would consume over 60% of net revenue, it was unreasonable. Id.
Suffice it to say that the sparse case law on the subject provides little guidance to courts,
businesses, claimants, or their attorneys.
32
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 108 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 391.
33
Id.
34
Captioned Movie Access Advocacy–Timeline, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF, http://www.nad.org/
issues/technology/movie-captioning/timeline (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter
NAT’L ASS’N DEAF]; Tripod Captioned Films Timeline, 19931999 (on file with author); Alma
Freeman, A Year of Insight, IN FOCUS, Nov. 2003, http://www.natoonline.org/infocus/
03november/insight.htm.
35
Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas, No. Civ. 00-173-AS, 2002 WL 31440885, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 3,
2002) (noting the limited availability of open-captioned films and also explaining that the
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Captioning technology changed dramatically in 1997 when the
Media Access Group at WGBH public television in Boston developed
and patented the Rear Windows Captioning System (“RWC”). The
captions are displayed in mirror image on an LED reader-board
mounted on the rear wall of the theater. Patrons wishing to see the
captions pick up a transparent plastic reflector—about the depth and
twice the width of an automobile rear-view mirror—mounted on a
flexible gooseneck that either sits on the floor or fit into the cup-holder.
By adjusting the reflector, viewers can place the captions either directly
below or actually on the movie print.36 These are “closed” captions,
visible only to people who requested the reflector.37 Notably, RWC does
not require a separate film print. The captions are placed on a computer
disc distributed free of charge to theaters. All a theater must do is
simply install the necessary equipment and pay an annual licensing fee.38
Shortly thereafter, a system was developed to show open captions
without requiring a separate print. Under this method, the captions,
contained on the same compact disc as the closed captions, are projected
from a separate projector and superimposed on the screen.39 The
captions can be either turned on or off for any given showing.40 While
some people with hearing loss have favored open captions,41 the theaters
believe that hearing audiences find open captions distracting and
undesirable.42 As a result, those theaters showing open-captioned

defendants showed every available open-captioned film for as long as the film was
available, which resulted in captioned films at least “once a month” in Portland, Oregon).
36
See Making Movie Theatres Accessible to Disabled Audiences, WGBH NAT’L CENTER FOR
ACCESSIBLE MEDIA (Nov. 13, 2010), http://ncam.wgbh.org/mopix/ (providing a picture of
RWC in operation).
37
Ball v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122 (D.D.C. 2004).
38
Id. at 123.
39
See DTS Access:
FAQ for Patrons, MANN THEATRES (Nov. 13, 2010),
http://www.manntheatres.com/docs/dts-css-faq.pdf (describing the system, which is
known as DTS-CSS).
40
Id.; see Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 668
(9th Cir. 2010) (accurately describing modern open captioning but erroneously suggesting
that captions are turned on or off depending upon patron request); see also Making Movie
Theatres Accessible to Disabled Audiences, supra note 36 (explaining that most theaters that use
open captions determine in advance which showings will be captioned and which will not
and advertise the captioned showings in advance).
41
Ball, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (describing objections to proposed settlement calling for
closed captioning).
42
Comments of National Association of Theatre Owners, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, CRT Docket No. 106, 1314 (Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter National Association
of Theatre Owners Comments], available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!
documentDetail;D=DOJ-CRT-2008-0015-2646 (last visited Dec. 22, 2010) (“Both open and
closed captioning currently entail significant costs—the former primarily as a function of
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movies do not utilize the captions for every showing but instead offer
limited show times, generally at off-peak hours.43
As the display methods were developed and improved, more
studios began cooperating with WGBH by furnishing advance copies of
their movies. This allowed WGBH to prepare the captions in time for the
movie opening. As a result, the number of movies available with
captions has increased dramatically, rising from a total of two releases in
1997, including The Jackal and Titanic,44 to virtually all major-studio
releases today.45

demonstrable rejection of captioned movies by patrons without a hearing disability, and
the latter primarily as a function of the substantial cost of the technology itself.”).
These comments were made in response to a 2008 proposal to require some form of
movie captioning. At that time, the DOJ deferred the question, but currently the DOJ is
raising the movie-captioning issue again in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
discussed later in this Article.
43
The great majority of open-captioned movies are shown by theaters owned and
operated by Regal Cinemas, the nation’s largest theater circuit, which operates under the
names Regal, Edwards, and United Artists. A nationwide listing of captioned movies is
available online at http://www.regmovies.com/nowshowing/opencaptionedshowtimes.
aspx (last visited Jan, 31, 2011). Regal generally shows open-captioned rather than closedcaptioned movies. It has equipped roughly 190 of its 560 theater complexes with some
captioning capability. This normally includes a single auditorium, and never more than
two auditoriums. Thus, roughly 200 of its 6739 auditoriums, or a shade less than 3%, are
equipped to show open-captioned movies.
Regal’s normal pattern is twelve open-captioned showings per week. It usually
shows the first movie of the day on Friday—normally a late-morning movie. On Saturday,
the mid-afternoon showing is captioned. On Sunday, the late-morning and late-evening
(usually beginning at 9 p.m. or later) shows are captioned. On Monday and Wednesday,
the late-morning and “prime time” evening show is captioned. On Tuesdays and
Thursdays, the captioned shows are the mid-afternoon and the late evening showings.
With no evening and only one afternoon showing on weekends, this schedule is not
particularly appealing to working families with children.
This pattern arose as a result of Regal’s settlement with the New Jersey Attorney
General, who required Regal to present four captioned showings each weekend, including
one evening showing. Settlement Agreement at 3–4, Harvey v. Anschutz Corp., No. C-9704 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (on file with author). But the agreement defined “weekend” as
Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and defined “evening” as any show beginning after 5:30
p.m. and before 10 p.m. Id. at 3. Regal satisfied the letter, if not the spirit, of the agreement
by choosing the last Sunday evening showing—generally beginning after 9 p.m.—as its
weekend evening show.
44
For information about movies available with captions, see the Media Access Group
website, available at http://ncam.wgbh.org/mopix/aboutproject.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2011).
45
All movie captioning today is done by businesses affiliated with WGBH. E-mail from
Mary Watkins of WGBH, to author, (Oct. 5, 2010: 3:33 PM) (on file with author); see All
MoPix Films, WGBH NAT’L CENTER FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDIA (Nov. 13, 2010),
http://ncam.wgbh.org/mopix/mopixmovies.html (listing the current releases and all past
releases for which captions have been prepared).
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III. THE COURTS AND MOVIE CAPTIONING: EARLY CASES, MIXED RESULTS
When the theaters were slow to install and use captioning
equipment, people with hearing loss went to court. In the first case,
Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas,46 the plaintiffs were nothing if not ambitious.
Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of “[a]ll deaf individuals in the United
States,”47 and asked that all theaters owned by three major corporations
be required to install the RWC system or a comparable auxiliary aid.
The case was dismissed on summary judgment. Although the
magistrate’s recommendations contained an array of debatable legal
conclusions,48 the dispositive fact was that, at the time of the trial, all the
defendants were obtaining and showing every open-captioned film
available for as long as the print was available to them.49 Even though
that resulted in only one captioned showing per month, the magistrate
found that more movies were available in the open-captioned format
than the RWC format.50 Moreover, the theaters successfully introduced
another complicating factor: their plan to abandon film altogether and
receive and display films using digital technology. Therefore, the
theaters asserted that this would render RWC obsolete.51 The magistrate
thus concluded that it would be “unduly burdensome” to force the
theaters to make the RWC format available “when such action will not
immediately increase the number of films available to Plaintiffs and

46
Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas, No. Civ. 00-173-AS, 2002 WL 31440885 (Jan. 3, 2002)
(magistrate’s recommendations on motion for summary judgment), adopted in part, 2002
WL 31469787 (March 19, 2002); see also Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas, No. Civ. 00-173-AS, 2000
WL 1364236 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2000) (decision ruling on a motion to dismiss).
47
Cornilles, 2000 WL 1364236, at *1.
48
Cornilles, 2002 WL 31440885, at *6.
49
Id. The Cornilles court’s acknowledgment that the ADA only requires physical access
to the facility and that the theater’s “inventory,” which the ADA does not regulate, consists
only of non-captioned films, appears no longer to be valid in light of Arizona ex. rel. Goddard
v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010). The “inventory” argument,
however, may have been defensible at the time when showing a captioned movie required
the theater to obtain a separate print.
50
Cornilles, 2002 WL 31440885, at *7.
51
For an extensive discussion on the digital-conversion issue, see the Department of
Justice’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Disability, Movie Captioning and Video Description, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,467, 43,473 (proposed
July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36); Digital Projection in Theaters Slowed By
Dispute, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (March 21, 2007), http://npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=9047637. The NPR report notes that replacing 35mm film with
digital data transmitted over the internet would save the movie studios substantial sums of
money, and that as a result, the studios and theaters were arguing over how the cost of
converting theaters to digital projection should be shared.
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when the technology installed may become obsolete in the next three to
five years.”52
The district court only adopted the magistrate’s recommendation
related to ultimate cost, declaring that “anticipated costs of $6 million to
$36 million per defendant is unreasonable as a matter of law.”53
Although the court noted that this finding was made in the context of
limited availability of RWC product and advancing technology, the
blanket assertion that the costs were an undue burden as a matter of
law—a statement made without any form of economic analysis—has the
unfortunate result of broadening rather than narrowing the case holding.
Plaintiffs fared considerably better in another captioning case,
arising out of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, by
reducing the scope of their demand.54 In Ball v. AMC Entertainment,55 the
plaintiffs restricted their complaint to the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area and asked only that “a fair number of” screens be equipped to show
RWC movies.56 Additionally, the plaintiffs conceded that the theaters
were neither required to caption the movies nor restricted to showing
movies for which captions were available—the demand was only that
the theaters obtain and use the caption disc when they showed movies
for which captions were available.57
The district court denied the defense’s motion for summary
judgment. The court ruled that nothing in the ADA or the implementing
regulations precludes requiring closed-captioned movies.58 The court
rejected the argument that the theater’s “goods and services” are noncaptioned movies, stating that closed-captioned movies do not change
the movie-going experience for other viewers and therefore do not affect
the services offered to the public.59 The court acknowledged that the
question of whether showing captioned movies would impose an undue
burden was a factual question, and proceeded to reject the premise
supported by the Cornilles case that captioning could be an undue
burden as a matter of law. The court went on to distinguish Cornilles by
Cornilles, 2002 WL 31440885, at *7.
Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas, 2002 WL 31469787, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 12, 2002).
54
See generally Comment, Civil Rights—Americans with Disabilities Act—District Court
Approves Settlement Requiring Movie Theaters To Provide Closed Captioning for Deaf and HardOf-Hearing People—Ball v. AMC Entertainment Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D.D.C. 2004), 118
HARV. L. REV. 1777 (2005) (articulating the view that litigation success was inversely related
to the scope of the requested relief was set out persuasively in Comment).
55
246 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2003).
56
Id. at 21 n.10. The court subsequently approved the settlement after a fairness hearing.
Ball v. AMC Entm’t Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2004).
57
Ball, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 21 n.10.
58
Id. at 24.
59
Id. at 25–26.
52
53
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noting that while the plaintiffs in Cornilles asked that all theaters in the
country be equipped to show captioned movies, the plaintiffs in the case
at bar limited their request to a “fair number” of theaters in a discrete
geographic area.60
After the court denied summary judgment, the parties began
negotiations and eventually agreed that defendants would install six
RWC units in their theaters within twelve months, along with six
additional units in the following twelve months.61 Because it was a classaction case, the settlement was subject to a fairness hearing, where it
came under considerable fire from a number of individuals and
organizations representing the deaf community.62
The principal objection was to RWC as the selected accommodation;
many of the protestors preferred open captions.63 The court dismissed
the objections and approved the settlement, noting first that the adverse
legislative history would make it difficult for any court to require open
captioning.64 While conceding that RWC might not provide a deaf
individual with a movie-going experience equal to that of a hearing
person,65 the court said the settlement would provide greater access to
movies in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area than was available
anywhere else and could potentially “set the standard for what other
communities, at a very minimum, should be offering.”66
The hope that other courts would view the Ball case settlement as a
minimum standard did not materialize. In Todd v. American MultiCinema, Inc.,67 the plaintiffs again got overly ambitious. Not only did
they ask that all theaters be equipped to show captioned movies, but
they also sued the movie studios themselves, contending that the failure
to caption all their films was a denial of the First Amendment rights of
people with hearing loss. After dismissing the suit against the movie
studios,68 the court granted summary judgment to the movie theaters,
declaring that the plaintiffs had not introduced specific evidence to
refute the defendants’ assertions that captioning would constitute an
undue burden.69 Then, as an alternative holding, the court said that the
Id. at 26 & n.22.
Ball, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (ruling on fairness hearing).
62
Id. at 124–25.
63
Id. at 127.
64
Id. at 129–30.
65
Id. at 132.
66
Id.
67
2004 WL 1764686 (S.D. Texas, Aug. 5, 2004).
68
Todd v. Am. Multi-Cinemas, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 118, 123 (S.D. Texas 2003) (ruling on
motion to dismiss).
69
Todd, 2004 WL 1764686, at *4. The court noted that it would cost Regal Cinemas, the
nation’s largest theater chain, an estimated $76,837,500 to equip all of its theaters to show
60
61
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ADA requires only equal physical access but not equal enjoyment, a
conclusion that seemingly ignores the requirement for auxiliary aids and
services.70
Over the next two years, settlements in movie-captioning cases
brought by the New Jersey and New York attorneys general required
defendant theaters to equip one screen in most of their multiplexes to
show captioned films.71 In retrospect, it appears that the states settled for
too little, particularly given the fact that the theaters were reporting a
robust financial condition to their investors yet pleading poverty at the
same time to the courts. Evidently, when the states generally balanced
the expense and time of litigation and the possibility that a court might
adopt the Todd no-captioning rationale, they decided to settle for what
the theaters were willing to give. Essentially, all the theaters voluntarily
would do what they had already agreed to do in the Ball case. Contrary
to the Ball court’s hope, the agreement in that case effectively set a
ceiling, rather than a floor, on movie access.72

captioning. Id. Yet in 2003, the year prior to the court’s opinion, Regal paid dividends of
$789.3 million—ten times the amount of converting every theater to show captioned
movies. Regal Entertainment Group, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (March 16, 2004), at 6.
Also, between 1997 and 2003, Regal had spent over $2 billion to upgrade and expand their
theaters. Id. A more searching inquiry into the “undue burden” claim might have raised
the question of whether expenses that can be covered by a fractional reduction in dividends
can ever be construed as an “undue burden,” much less declared to be so essentially as a
matter of law simply because the cost involved is significant.
70
Todd, 2004 WL 1764686, at *4. The court bolstered that conclusion by citing the
legislative history to the effect that theaters are encouraged—but not required—to show
captioned movies, and said that if the ADA were interpreted to require captioning, then it
would be mandatory rather than permissive. Id. This appears to be a situation where
ambiguous legislative history was given precedence over statutory language.
71
The New Jersey case required thirty-nine closed-captioned installations at thirty-five
different movie complexes and one open-captioned installation at each Regal multiplex
with ten or more screens. The New York settlement resulted in roughly 3% of the state’s
movie screens being equipped to show captioned movies. NAT’L ASS’N DEAF, supra note 34
(information is accessible by scrolling down to the year labeled “2005”).
72
A recent settlement in a Massachusetts case brought by that state’s attorney general
ups the ante but only a little. It provides that theaters will equip 10% of their auditoriums
to show captioned films, rounded up to the nearest whole number. Three National Movie
Theater Chains Agree to Increase Accessibility for Hearing and Visually Impaired (July 29, 2010),
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Cago&b=pressre
lease&f=2010_07_29_movie_theater_agreements&csid=Cago (displaying the settlement
agreements at hand). Although not finalized until July 29, 2010, the attorney who worked
on the case informed the author that in fact, the terms were negotiated prior to the Ninth
Circuit decision in the Harkins case discussed infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text, the
first appellate court case to deal with movie captioning. At the time of the negotiations,
then, Massachusetts had to acknowledge that the lower-court decision in the Harkins case,
which said that theaters have no obligation whatsoever to provide captioning, might be
affirmed, a possibility that significantly moderated the attorney general’s settlement
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IV. THE COURTS AND MOVIE CAPTIONING: THE TIDE TURNS
If it were possible to find a worse movie-access case than Todd from
the point of view of people with hearing loss, it came from an Arizona
district court in a case brought by that state’s attorney general: Arizona
ex. rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc.73 The state in that
case alleged that the Harkins theater chain violated both the ADA and
state disability law by failing to provide either captioned movies or
descriptive videos for the visually impaired.74 The court granted a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Without reaching the
undue burden question,75 the court declared that the ADA does not
require businesses to alter their mix of products or services. The court
relied on several cases stating that the ADA does not regulate the content
of insurance policies.76 Furthermore, each of those aforementioned cases
in turn cited the DOJ commentary to the effect that the ADA does not
require bookstores to stock Braille books, thus further supporting the
court’s overall conclusion that the ADA does not require an alteration of
products or services.77 The court explained that, in the case at bar,
captions would alter movies by converting auditory elements into
visual,78 thereby altering the composition of the theater’s inventory.
Additionally, relying on both the legislative history and regulatory
interpretations stating that the ADA does not require open-captioned
movies, the court ultimately concluded that the ADA also did not
require closed-captioned movies.79

position. Telephone Interview with Adam Hollingsworth, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, Massachusetts (Aug. 10, 2010).
73
548 F. Supp. 2d 723 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 603 F.3d 666 (9th Cir.
2010).
74
Harkins Amusement Enters., 548 F. Supp. 2d at 726. Video descriptions augment the
soundtrack by providing descriptions of what is happening on the screen during natural
pauses in the dialogue. Id. at 729. The descriptions are heard through headsets available
upon request to visually impaired patrons. Id.
75
Id. at 727. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, defendants did not argue that
providing captions and descriptions would constitute an undue burden. Id.
76
See generally id. (citing McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2000), Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000), and Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins., Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999)). The author has been unable to locate any
cases dealing with the product-content question that arose in any context other than claims
that a provision in an insurance policy was discriminatory.
77
Id. at 72829. This DOJ commentary to the effect that retailers do not need to alter
their inventory to provide products accessible to people with disabilities has provided the
basis for the so-called “inventory” argument that the theaters have used in every moviecaptioning case.
78
Id. at 729.
79
Id. at 731.
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Nevertheless, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed important
aspects of the district court’s decision.80 The Ninth Circuit articulated
that, while the ADA may not generally regulate the content of goods or
services sold, the specific requirement to provide auxiliary aids and
services is an exception to that general rule.81 Therefore, captions and
descriptions are mandated by the ADA unless the theater can
demonstrate that providing captions and descriptions constitute a
fundamental alteration or impose an undue burden.82 Without taking an
explicit position on whether the legislative history’s reference to open
captions overrode the statutory requirement that auxiliary aids and
services be provided,83 the court held that theaters are entitled to rely on
the DOJ’s statements that open captions are not required84 until and
unless that position changes. Moreover, the court further held that the
possible distraction open captions could pose for a hearing audience
would provide a rational basis for treating the forms of captioning
differently. Therefore, the Harkins court ultimately concluded that open
captions are not required.85
A critical factor in the Harkins case is that the DOJ filed an amicus
curiae brief on the side of the plaintiffs.86 While being deliberately vague
about open captioning,87 the DOJ argued that closed captions, which are
auxiliary aids and services within the meaning of the ADA,88 are merely
a means by which a theater’s service of screening movies is delivered
and do not alter the content of the service.89 The DOJ also took sharp
issue with the theaters’ efforts to analogize their situation to a bookstore

80
Arizona ex rel Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666 (9th Cir.
2010).
81
Id. at 672.
82
Id. at 675.
83
The Department of Justice’s amicus brief, discussed infra notes 84, 86–90 and
accompanying text, was equally vague on the open-caption question.
84
The explicit statement that open captions are not required is contained in the
explanatory appendix stating that “[m]ovie theaters are not required by § 36.303 to present
open-captioned films.” Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and
Urging Reversal at 8, Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666 (No. 08-16075), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/azharkins.pdf.
85
Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d at 673.
86
Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 84, at 8.
87
See id. at 12, 26. Noting that open captioning, at the time of ADA’s passage, required
physical possession of one of the limited numbers of separate captioned prints, the DOJ
stated that the appellate court should not apply “the House Report’s outdated discussion of
open-captioning to all types of presently available captioning,” at least hinting that the
legislative history in the House Report might not even preclude requiring modern open
captioning. Id. at 26.
88
Id. at 12.
89
Id. at 17.
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not being required to stock Braille books. The DOJ explained that
because the studios supply the captions on discs, the theaters’
“inventory” is in fact captioned movies. The appropriate analogy, the
DOJ argued, was to a bookstore that had Braille books in stock but
refused to sell them.90
The Harkins case was remanded for further proceedings. While the
appellate opinion stated that the theaters could raise both the
fundamental alteration and undue burden defenses,91 the DOJ stated
explicitly in its amicus filing that closed captions “in no way alter a
theater’s service (i.e., screening movies) for persons without sensory
disabilities.”92 Assuming the DOJ adheres to that position and that its
interpretation receives appropriate deference from the lower court, the
issue on remand appears to be one of simple economics—how much can
the theaters afford to spend to provide captioning?93

Id. at 21.
Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 675 (9th
Cir. 2010).
92
Id.; Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 84, at
30.
93
The outcome was essentially identical in a similar movie-captioning case filed in
Washington State by the Washington State Communication Access Project, a non-profit
membership corporation, against five corporate theater owners in King County
(metropolitan Seattle). See Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against
Defendants Regal, AMC, Cinemark, Silver Cinemas and Lincoln Square, Wash-CAP v.
Regal Cinemas, Inc., No. 09-2-06322-2-SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2010) (on file with
author); Wash-CAP v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., No. 09-2-06322-2-SEA (King Cty. Sup. Ct. May
4, 2010) (order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment) (on file with author). The author represented the plaintiff in that case. The case
relied exclusively on Washington State’s Law Against Discrimination. Id. (utilizing WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60–.60.401 (West 2008)). The case also relied on the statute’s
implementing regulations, which require public businesses like movie theaters to make
“reasonable accommodation to the known physical, sensory, or mental limitations of a
person with a disability.” WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-26-080(1) (2011). According to the
statute, reasonable accommodation is defined as “action, reasonably possible in the
circumstances, to make the regular services of a place of public accommodation accessible,”
and “accessible” is defined as “usable or understandable.” Id. § 162-26-040(2).
The ADA is explicitly non-preemptive. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2006) (“Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any
Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that
provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are
afforded by this chapter.”). Washington also takes a very strong position to the effect that
its state law is separate from and independent of the ADA, legislatively nullifying the state
supreme court’s attempts to give ADA decisions controlling effect in interpreting state law.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60–.60.401 (West 2008) (repudiating through legislation
state supreme court decision McClarty v. Totem Electric, 137 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2006) and
affirming the independent nature of state law). Although the Harkins case was on appeal,
we took the position that its resolution should not affect the decision in our case.
90
91
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V. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROPOSES A CAPTIONING RULE
In July of 2010, and apparently timed to coincide with the twentieth
anniversary of the ADA’s passage,94 the DOJ issued an Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking concerning movie captioning95 that was
consistent with the approach it took in the Harkins case. In its Advance
Notice, the DOJ proposed a requirement that half of all theater screens be
equipped to show closed-captioned and video-described movies over a
five-year period, which would require modification of about 10% of
theater screens per year.96
The DOJ noted that approximately 88% of the first-run movies
released by major studios are captioned, but only 1% or less of the movie
showings across the country are captioned.97 This discrepancy between
availability and deployment of captions exists, according to the DOJ,
because the theaters have not purchased and installed the necessary
display equipment.98 The DOJ recognized that the captioning question
has become intertwined with the pending industry conversion to digital
display, in which motion pictures cease to exist as film and instead
become digital files.99 The theaters generally request that any captioning
requirement be abated pending that conversion, partly because
captioning may be less expensive when done with digital projection.
Indeed, open captioning costs nothing. Additionally, theaters wish to
The court in Wash-CAP granted plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
agreeing that the defendant theaters were required to do what was reasonably possible to
make the movie soundtracks understandable, which the court will determine after a trial
on the merits. Wash-CAP, No. 09-2-06322-2-SEA, at 3–4 (order granting in part and denying
in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment). The Harkins decision was released four
days previous to the King County decision, but the judge indicated to the parties in our
case that she was ready to rule and that further briefing on the Harkins decision would not
be useful. Id.
While the question of what is “reasonably possible in the circumstances” appears to
have both technical and economic dimensions, the availability of multiple forms of
captioning suggests that there are no technical barriers to making soundtracks
understandable and therefore the question in the Wash-CAP case will essentially be the
same question as is presented by the Harkins remand—how much can the theaters afford?
94
The proposed regulations first appeared online on July 23, 2010, the day the
Department of Justice had a number of events to commemorate the passage of the ADA.
Dep’t of Justice, Disability Rights Online News, ADA (Sept. 2010), http://www.ada.gov/
newsltr0910.pdf.
95
See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video
Description, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,467 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36)
(notifying the public about the regulations).
96
Id. at 43,474.
97
Id. at 43,47273.
98
Id. at 43,473.
99
Id.
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postpone the captioning requirement due to some uncertainty about
whether the equipment used to show captions in a film format can be
used with digital projection.100 In response, however, the DOJ explained
that digital conversion has been anticipated for many years, yet its
ultimate timing remains open to question. In essence, while the DOJ
acknowledged that digital conversion would facilitate captioning and
that captioning can be provided in either the film or digital format, it
ultimately concludes that access should not be delayed until the
conversion occurs.101
Many individuals and organizations who advocate for people with
hearing loss were pleased that the DOJ was actively involving itself in
the movie-captioning issue, but were puzzled by the proposal’s implicit
statement that 50% access will be “good enough.”102 Under the language
of the ADA, the obligation to provide auxiliary aids and services persists
“unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would
fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue
burden.”103 By placing the burden squarely on the entity alone, it seems
abundantly clear that the ADA calls for individualized determinations of
whether each specific company would find that providing the requisite
aids and services is unduly burdensome for any particular business.
The rub, obviously, is that while the structure of the statute is clear,
the words “undue burden” provide very little guidance. As noted
previously, Congress might as well have said, “do this unless it would
cost too much.”104 Not surprisingly, opinions about how much expense
is “too much” vary considerably, depending on whether one would be
burdened by the expense or benefited by the resulting accommodation.
While the DOJ has, through regulation, provided a laundry list of factors

Id.
Id.
102
The DOJ also published updated Title III regulations. As part of its economic analysis,
the DOJ noted that increased accessibility has important but intangible benefits for people
with disabilities by reducing “feelings of being stigmatized as different or inferior from
being relegated to use other, less comfortable or pleasant elements of a facility.”
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,244 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 36). The author has some difficulty reconciling the acknowledgement that lesser
treatment is inherently stigmatizing and therefore damaging, with a proposal that would
permit theaters to effectively exclude individuals with hearing loss from half of their
facilities.
103
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
104
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2010) (providing that the regulatory definition of “undue
burden” is “significant difficulty or expense”). The regulation provides alternate verbiage
but no greater clarity. Id.
100
101
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that should be considered,105 none of those factors suggest answers to the
ultimate question of how much is too much. Consequently, facilities
asked to provide aids and services can and do say with perfect sincerity
that the cost would impose an “undue burden,” with an emphasis on the
“burden” part, while parties requesting the accommodation can and do
say with equal sincerity that although the aids and services are not free,
the burden of providing them is not “undue.”
The result of this standardless defense is extraordinarily high
transaction costs relative to the expense of the benefit ultimately
provided. In the Ball case, for example, the theaters ultimately agreed to
equip sixteen theaters to show captioned films. Based on estimates that
the theaters used in other cases,106 that cost would have been roughly
$12,500 per theater, or $200,000 total.107 Yet, according to the Ball court’s
decision at the fairness hearing, the defendants agreed to pay the
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees of $260,000 in addition to what they paid their
own attorneys.108 Thus, the defendants spent considerably more on legal
fees than they ultimately spent on access.
Because of the high transaction costs, an impulse to create a
transparent and readily applied performance test as a measure of the
theater’s obligations is understandable and highly laudable. But that
desire for transparency and ease of administration cannot justify
105

28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2010). The regulation provides the following:
Undue burden means significant difficulty or expense.
In
determining whether an action would result in an undue burden,
factors to be considered include—
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part;
(2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in
the action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect on
expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are
necessary for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; or
the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the site;
(3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal
relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or
entity;
(4) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent
corporation or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type,
and location of its facilities; and
(5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent
corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity.

Id.
106
Todd v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 2004 WL 1764686, at *2 n.5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5,
2004).
107
Id.
108
Ball v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126 n.12 (D.D.C. 2004).
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scuttling the individualized, resource-based “undue burden” standard109
and substituting a performance-based standard that might require too
much of some firms and too little of others. Instead, the DOJ ought to
look for a transparent test based on the regulatory definition of “undue
burden” as involving “significant” expense. The author believes such a
resource-based standard can be developed.
In its most recent revision of the Title III regulations, the DOJ
proposed a small-business “safe harbor” provision related to the
statutory requirement that businesses remove architectural barriers in
existing buildings where doing so is “readily achievable.” The proposal
was to define “readily achievable” as being 1% or less of the business’s
gross annual revenue.110 The DOJ abandoned the proposal, somewhat
reluctantly, it appears,111 for a number of reasons. First, both industry
and advocacy groups were opposed; the former because they believed
1% of gross revenue was “too substantial,”112 and the latter because they
believed it would permit some small businesses to do less than they
could readily achieve.113 Second, there was a concern that any revenuebased yardstick would become a floor as well as a ceiling, possibly
leading to demands for the removal of insubstantial barriers simply
because the establishment had spent less than the safe harbor amount.114
Third, there was a concern that the plan would require significant
record-keeping and that disclosure of the relevant financial information
could be burdensome and intrusive.115 Finally, there was a concern that
applying the same financial yardstick to different industries with very
different economics would produce unfair and arbitrary results.116
109
In the controversial case of Sutton v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court stated that the
determination of whether an individual was “disabled” within the meaning of ADA
demanded an individualized inquiry, and said that DOJ guidelines were invalid because
they would treat certain conditions on a generalized, group basis rather than as
individuals. 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Although Congress legislatively overturned the
Sutton results in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, the case still stands for the limited
proposition that the DOJ cannot substitute a generalized approach when ADA requires
individualized, case-by-case decision-making. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (Supp. II 2008);
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
110
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,293 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 36).
111
Id. at 56,295.
112
Id. at 56,294.
113
Id. After thirty years as a practicing attorney, the author has come to believe that
equally fervent opposition from both sides may indicate that a proposal has considerable
merit.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
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Although a revenue-based safe harbor might have been an
unworkable standard for defining the obligation of many different types
of small businesses to remove barriers, those difficulties largely
disappear in the very specific context of movie captioning. The author
therefore urges the DOJ to strongly consider declaring that a fixed
percentage of gross revenue spent to install and maintain captioning
equipment is presumptively a “due,” rather than an “undue” burden,
and is therefore presumptively required under the ADA.
The business community’s principal objection to the proposed safe
harbor provision is that it is based on gross revenue, and a more
reasonable approach would be a safe harbor based on net revenue “so
that operating expenses are offset.”117 That objection, however, misses
the fundamental point that providing access is, in itself, an operating
expense or a cost of doing business. Moreover, net revenue is an elusive
concept subject to considerable variation depending upon the way the
business is organized and the accounting method used. Many small
businesses never actually show a net profit—they spend what they
make, much of it on salaries.118
As the DOJ suggested,119 and with which the author concurs, any
revenue-based standard should be nothing more than a rebuttable
presumption. A business that cannot spend the presumptive amount
would be free to assert that doing so would constitute an undue burden.
Still, that business would continue to bear the burden of proof on that
issue, just as is the case presently under the statute. If, on the other hand,
the business had spent the presumptive amount, the burden would then
shift to the claimant to demonstrate that spending more would not
constitute an undue burden. This approach would not override the
statutory “undue burden” standard, but it would provide some
guidance to the courts when answering the critical question embodied in
the statutory standard regarding how much is “too much.”
If a rule based on gross revenue were adopted, the obvious question
becomes what that rule should be, or in other words, how much is “too
much.” The DOJ’s 1% proposal related to the removal of architectural
barriers, which the ADA requires only to the extent “[r]eadily
achievable,” a standard the DOJ defines in its regulations as capable of
being “carried out without much difficulty or expense.”120 “Undue
burden,” though, clearly requires more, as the regulations define it as

117
118
119
120

Id. at 56,294.
Id. at 56,295.
Id. at 56,294.
28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2009).
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“significant difficulty or expense.”121 Although neither the statute nor
any regulations provide specific guidance on what the difference is
between “significant expense” and “without great expense,” a 2:1 ratio
does not seem unreasonable as a starting point for discussion.122 On that
basis, the author would propose that an appropriate proportion of gross
revenue presumed to constitute an “undue burden” should be 2%
annually. A greater expense would presumptively constitute an undue
burden; a lesser expense would not.
Any presumptive guideline should both allow and require access
expenses to be aggregated and carried forward for a certain period of
time, such as three years. If the business in one year spends 6% of its
gross revenue on providing access, the business should be able to claim
“safe harbor” for three years. Aggregation, however, should work both
ways. If a business has spent nothing on access for the prior two years, it
should be presumptively required to spend 6% of its gross revenue in
the third year.
The effect of such a regulation would be that most, if not all, theaters
would become fully accessible. Those theaters with significant revenue
and means would do so sooner, and those with fewer resources would
do so later. Requiring theaters to become accessible at a pace
commensurate with their resources also appears far more consistent with
the “undue burden” standard than the non-individualized five-year
phase-in proposed by the DOJ. Like the 50% access standard, the fiveyear phase-in may require too much of some theaters but too little of
others.
The concern that any revenue-based presumption would become a
“floor” might be a problem when the issue is as generalized as “barrier
removal.”123 This is because there may be no end as to how many
barriers can be removed. This possibility of spending without end
disappears, however, when a revenue-based presumption aims at the
very specific requirement of providing auxiliary aids and services. The
DOJ can and should make clear that the requirement deals with two
things—captioning and video descriptions.
When a theater has
provided captions and descriptions on all its screens, the only necessary

Id.
The author would note that this suggestion is no more or less arbitrary than the DOJ’s
proposal to require that half the movie auditoriums be equipped to show captioned
movies, a proposal that seems to have arisen only because it splits the difference between
what the people with hearing loss want, which is total accessibility, and what the theaters
want, which is no requirement.
123
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,294.
121
122
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expense is repair and replacement. There is no possibility of unknown
and never-ending additional demands.
Record-keeping need not be a problem. The large corporate theater
owners that are public corporations report extensive financial data
pursuant to Securities and Exchange Commission requirements. Other
businesses report gross revenue on their tax returns, whether it is a
Schedule C to an individual income tax return or a corporate or
partnership return. The penalties for tax fraud are such that there is a
strong presumption of accuracy on those returns.
The reduction in transaction costs would be immediate and, in all
likelihood, complete. A business needing to install captioning and
descriptive video equipment would only need to get a cost quote and
compare that number to their gross revenue. That comparison would
indicate at once whether the cost would be presumptively reasonable,
either all at once or spread over a period of time. A business realizing it
would be presumptively capable of providing the required equipment
would either do so voluntarily or determine whether it could
demonstrate extenuating circumstances and rebut the presumption of
reasonableness. Conversely, a business that was not even presumptively
capable of providing access, or had already spent the presumptively
required amounts, could simply produce the tax data and any data on
incurred costs to whomever is doing the requesting. Either way, there
would be little need or incentive for litigation, reducing the transaction
costs to little or nothing and permitting the businesses to spend their
money on providing access, rather than fighting access.124
Without disputing whether a percentage-of-gross presumption
would work for all industries, the author believes it would work well for
movie theaters. The reason for this conclusion is that if the requirement
is applied uniformly to all theaters, it becomes relatively easy for the
theaters to incorporate the uniform costs into their price structure.
Additionally, because movie tickets are relatively inexpensive forms of
entertainment—generally less than $10—a 2% price increase is not likely
to have any appreciable effect on attendance.125
124
To further reduce the opportunity for litigation, the DOJ could require a pre-litigation
request for financial information, namely, the gross revenue and access-expense numbers
for an appropriate number of years, and require appropriate rules of confidentiality. The
author’s experience has been that if the outcome of potential litigation is essentially
foreordained and both parties are aware of that outcome, it is seldom necessary to even file
suit.
125
Average movie ticket prices went up more than 8% between 2009 and 2010, while
total attendance declined only three-tenths of 8%. While much of that increase is
attributable to the premium price charged for 3-D movies, the average price for regular 2-D
movies went up 4%. Ben Rooney, 3D Movie Tickets Set for Epic Price Hike, CNNMONEY.COM
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The suggested 2%-of-gross presumption would yield significant and
immediate benefits in accessibility. Equipping a theater to show RWC
captions in a film costs roughly $11,000 per auditorium, while other
captioning methods cost considerably less.126 Regal Cinemas, the
nation’s largest exhibitor, operated 6,768 separate auditoriums at the end
of 2009. Equipping all of those screens to show RWC could cost as much
as $74,448,000. But in 2009, Regal’s gross income was $2.893 billion, 2%
of which would be $57,860,000. Thus, at the 2% of gross figure, Regal
could afford to equip all of its theaters to show captioned films in less
than two years.127
On the other end of the spectrum, the National Association of
Theatre Owners states that a typical small, independent movie operator
might expect gross annual revenues of roughly $100,000 per screen.128
Spending 2% of that amount per year, or $2000, could mean that five or
more years of spending would be required to caption each screen. In
reality, though, such a “Mom and Pop” operation would be eligible for
the tax credit of up to $5000 per year for qualified expenses that provide
access, including auxiliary aids and services.129 The reduction of the
actual cost to $6000 would make captioning equipment affordable over a
manageable time period.
In addition to the possibility of a small price increase, providing
access to people not presently able to enjoy a movie will bring in some
new patrons, and the cost of the equipment can be recovered over a
(March 25, 2010, 1:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/25/technology/3D_movie_
ticket_price_spike/. Those numbers suggest that demand is not particularly sensitive to
small price increases. Id.
126
Equipping a digital theater to show RWC costs about $9200 per auditorium. E-mail
attachment from Mary Watkins, WGBH, to author (June 22, 2010, 2:30 PM) (on file with
author). Some of the major theater chains are working on new devices to display closed
captions, and while the costs are not firmly established, they will presumably be less than
the RWC costs. Showing open captions at a digital theater costs nothing—the theater
operator simply selects the captioned package from the menu of digital options, and the
captions appear for that showing. E-mail from Mary Watkins, WGBH, to author (Aug. 13,
2010, 2:43 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Watkins].
127
The discussion of how a revenue-based rule might impact Regal appears to be largely
academic. In a declaration filed in support of a Motion to Stay the Washington moviecaptioning case, Wash-CAP v. Regal, Cinemas, Inc., Regal’s Chief Administrative Officer and
Counsel Raymond L. Smith, Jr., stated that once a digital cinema closed-captioning system
becomes available at a commercially reasonable price, Regal intends to equip all of its firstrun theaters with that equipment. Declaration of Raymond L. Smith, Jr., Wash-CAP, No.
09-2-06322-2-SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 31, 2011) (on file with author).
128
National Association of Theatre Owners Comments, supra note 42, at 29.
129
26 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). The Internal Revenue Code states that a business with less than
$1 million in annual gross revenue or fewer than thirty full-time employees may receive a
credit for 50% of all access-related expenditures exceeding $250, with a $10,250 maximum.
Id.
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relatively modest period of time. Regal’s published financial data shows
an average ticket price of $8.15 and per-patron concession purchases of
$3.17. Regal keeps, on average, $3.87 of the ticket price and pays $4.28 to
the distributor. With each additional patron contributing roughly $7 in
incremental revenue, recovering the “worst-case” captioning cost of
$11,000 per screen would require some 1570 additional admissions.
Regal’s average annual attendance per screen is 36,125, so a 4.3%
increase in attendance would recover Regal’s cost in one year, and an
increase of less than 1% in attendance would recover the “worst-case”
costs in less than five years.
In its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the DOJ also raised
the possibility of allowing theaters to opt for open captioning as a way to
satisfy their accessibility obligations. The author believes theaters
should not only be permitted but perhaps even encouraged to do so.
Although not required either by the Harkins decision or the DOJ
regulatory interpretations that provided the basis for that decision, open
captioning is undeniably effective as a means of communicating aural
information to people with hearing loss and is therefore a permissible
alternative.
From the theaters’ point of view, the potential advantage of open
captioning is that it is significantly less expensive than closed captioning.
Indeed, for theaters that have converted to digital projection, the cost of
open captioning is absolutely nothing. All the theater must do is merely
select the captioning package from the menu of digital options for that
particular showing, and the captions appear without the need for any
special display equipment.130 From the perspective of people with
hearing loss, open captions can be attractive because there is no need to
self-identify, no equipment to check out, and no need to focus back and
forth from the caption-display device to the screen.
As the DOJ additionally noted in its Advance Notice, open
captioning as deployed today offers only very limited access, as those
theaters that do show open-captioned movies engage the captions for
only certain showings, generally at less-than-optimal times.131 The stated
basis for limited deployment of open captioning is that at least some
portion of the hearing audience shuns captioned movies, and thus
attendance at the captioned shows is less than at non-captioned shows.132
Even if the facts are correct, the argument is fundamentally flawed.
If the potential patrons who avoid a captioned movie instead attend a
different movie at the same theater, or attend the captioned movie at a
130
131
132

See E-mail from Watkins, supra note 126.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
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time when it is shown without captions, the theater loses nothing. On
the other hand, if some of the attendees at the captioned showing are
individuals and their companions who would not otherwise attend a
movie at all because non-captioned movies are inaccessible, those
admissions could represent new revenue that the theaters would not
otherwise realize.
Implicit in this argument, though, is the acknowledgement that
where open captioning is used, it should not be required for every
showing. People who want to see a movie without captions should have
that option available to them, and if hearing audiences do indeed shun
open-captioned showings, theaters would lose money if they had to
engage the captions for every show. But theaters should not be able to
relegate all their open-captioned showings to late-morning, late-night, or
off-day showings and claim that such an arrangement provides effective
access.
The author posits the following as a reasonable measure of
accessibility for a theater that elects an open-caption option. First, there
should be at least one open-captioned showing per day. Second, the
theater should include at least two “prime-time” evening shows—the
showing beginning closest to 7:00 p.m.—each week, one of which must
be on either Friday or Saturday evening. Third, the theater should
include at least two mid-afternoon shows—the show beginning closest to
3:00 p.m.—each week, including one on either Saturday or Sunday
afternoon.
As a practical matter, a mix of closed captioning and open
captioning offerings may prove both effective and practical. Most
multiplex theaters are a mix of large and small auditoriums, the large
ones where more popular movies play upon release, and the smaller
ones where those movies migrate after they stop selling out in the larger
auditoriums. If open captions scare away hearing audiences, then
theater owners would likely employ closed captioning in their larger
auditoriums during the initial release of the movie. But by the time the
films run their course in the large auditoriums, they are no longer filling
even those smaller auditoriums. A theater owner might decide that it
makes more sense to provide open captions in those auditoriums than to
undertake the additional expense of equipping them to show closedcaptioned movies. By conspicuously publicizing which showings will be
open-captioned, both people who dislike and people who like captioning
will be able to plan their movie-going schedules accordingly.
The DOJ ought not let either the legislative history or the Harkins
decision deter it from permitting open captioning, or even requiring
open captioning as opposed to exempting a theater from the requirement
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to furnish auxiliary aids and services. As the DOJ argued in its Harkins
amicus brief, the legislative history in the ADA that suggests that opencaptioned movies are not required, can and perhaps should be limited to
the situation at the time of the enactment of the ADA, when an opencaptioned movie was a completely different thing than the uncaptioned
version of the same movie. Furthermore, the Harkins decision never
suggested that the DOJ could not require at least some open-captioned
movies. The decision merely held that because the DOJ had not yet
required open-captioned movies, and had a rational basis for not doing
so, the theaters could rely on its rule permitting but not requiring open
captioning. Yet nothing in the decision suggests that the DOJ could not
implement a new rule permitting open captioning, nor even a rule to the
effect that open captioning might even be required in situations where
closed captioning is not possible.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Captioning to make movies accessible to people with hearing loss
seems, superficially, to be a “no-brainer” under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Yet, for almost twenty years, due to an over-rigid
regulatory interpretation of ambiguous legislative history, judicial
skepticism towards the ADA, and undefined critical terms that
essentially require expensive litigation against a well-funded industry,
adversaries have combined to make accessible movies exceptional rather
than routine. The first court of appeals decision on the issue correctly
held that movie captioning may be required. That decision, combined
with the long-promised conversion to digital movie projection, could
dramatically increase the availability of captioned movies.
At the same time, the DOJ is now proposing to require movie
captioning by rule. Still, the proposal, which only calls for 50% of the
movie screens to show captioned movies, is fundamentally flawed
because it substitutes a performance standard for the individualized,
financially based statutory defense of “undue burden.” Nonetheless, the
proposal addresses the very real need to reduce the transactional costs of
access disputes by providing a readily applicable rule.
Instead, the author urges the DOJ to adopt a rule based on the
financial status of the theaters, which could provide accessibility,
certainty, and flexibility, while virtually eliminating the need for
litigation. The author further endorses the DOJ’s suggestion that at least
some of a theater’s access burdens might be satisfied through periodic
showings of open-captioned movies. Because open captioning is less
expensive, and is preferred by at least some members of the hearing-loss
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population, the open-caption option should be permitted and perhaps
even encouraged.
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